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Introduction
Debates about the benefits system in Britain conventionally start from two assumptions. The first is that public attitudes towards benefit claimants have become harsher, a view which can be overstated, but in general terms is borne out by the evidence (Baumberg 2014 (Hills 2014 ).
Yet while mythbusters have fact-checked claims by politicians and the media, there has been almost no academic study on whether the publi This is despite burgeoning academic literatures on public knowledge in other domains, particularly political knowledge (Carpini and Keeter 1996, Bullock et al. 2013 ), but also economics (Blinder and Krueger 2004) , inequality (Kuziemko et al. 2015) , and migration (Herda 2010) . In contrast, there are only a handful of academic studies over the past thirty years that examine benefits knowledge in Britain: rare qualitative studies that briefly touch on the issues (Briant et al 2011; Duffy 2013) and rare quantitative reports that only cover a small subset of the key issues (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2003 , Taylor-Gooby and Martin 2008 , Golding and Middleton 1982 . Moreover, across many of these fields of knowledge there is often T enterprise (e.g. Flvybjerg 2001); sometimes these claimed
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and how far and how certainly We use eighteen datasets across six survey series, including several that are being made available for wider academic study for the first time.
1 Before describing our methods in more detail, we look more closely at previous studies of levels of
What the public knows
It is a badly-kept secret that the public has poor aggregate levels of knowledge about science, social science and po I P C :79), "the most familiar fact to arise from sample surveys is that popular levels of information about public affairs are, from the point of view of an informed observer, astonishingly low T two typical examples: less than half of Britons or Americans know that the earth goes around the sun once per year (Durant et al. 1989) ; while many cannot even provide an estimate of key economic quantities like inflation, much less provide a correct one (TNS Opinion & Social 2010) . While it has been argued that people are often most accurate about phenomena they come into contact with (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2003:17) , there are F -estimate the proportion of people born abroad (Herda 2010) , and homosexuality (Martinez et al. 2008 ).
However, the literature on benefits knowledge is much smaller. A few US studies look at knowledge of Social Security and find that the public are (on average) roughly accurate in terms of the average Social Security benefit cheque (Blinder and Krueger 2004) and who qualifies for Social Security (Barabas 2012) . However, they are inconsistent in their knowledge of detailed program rules and tend to overestimate the incentive to work (Liebman and Luttmer 2012) , and while the perception that Social Security will be running deficits in future is accurate (Blinder and Krueger 2004) , the (Barabas 2012) ..
Greater inaccuracies are found for welfare payments, which are perceived to be a far greater cost to Government (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro 1999, CNN 2011) and to be more valuable to claimants (Kuklinski et al. 2000) than they actually are.
In the UK, there is only one relevant peer-reviewed study within the past fifteen years (although several non-academic polls exist; see below). This finds that many people know that the benefits system is one of the largest parts of public spending, but most wrongly think that unemployment benefits cost the state more than pensions (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2003) . Several of the British Social
Attitudes reports also find that the value of benefits is overestimated (e.g. Taylor-Gooby & Martin 2008) , which is also supported in a qualitative think-tank report (Duffy et al. 2013) , while other qualitative studies in the grey literature suggest that the public over-estimate benefits fraud (see below). Qualitative studies in peer-reviewed journals, however, have instead focussed on slightly separate issues, such as how benefit claimants judge other claimants to be undeserving (e.g. Chase & Walker 2013). Overall, while prior evidence is consistent with a priori assumptions that benefits knowledge in Britain is poor, these studies predominantly lie outside the peer-reviewed literature, and the evidence itself is scattered and sparse.
Yet the actual level of ignorance is far worse than this for even where the public are correct on average, this does not mean that most people individually K
influential study of US welfare knowledge finds that the public on average over-estimated the amount spent on welfare, the average welfare payment, and the proportion of people claiming welfare, but under-estimated the proportion of claimants who had been on welfare for 8+ years, and
were actually correct about the proportion who were African-American. Yet because these averages balance out different kinds of wrong answers among individuals, they found that "on none of the individual items did a majority, or close to it, get the fact right" (p797). The prior evidence from other countries and on other topics does not necessarily suggest that the public will consistently be biased towards negative misperceptions about benefits, but it does suggest that a widespread lack of knowledge is likely. We examine both aspects of this in our analysis below.
Defining myths
While not always considered in the literature on political knowledge, it is important to begin by W directly testable " including those about the benefits system will exist on both levels simultaneously, as will T " " (Carpini and Keeter 1996:80-81) . While widespread misperceptions around key aspects of the benefits system would be concerning, it is not reasonable to expect everyone to know everything about every issue. In our analysis, we therefore review every measure of benefit beliefs from British data that we have been able to obtain, leaving our judgement as to their respective relevance to the Conclusion.
Methods
T B benefits system in the recent past (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . This requires two interlinked sets of analyses one of public perceptions, another of the truth of the benefits system which we describe in turn.
Public perceptions
To investigate public perceptions, we conducted new analyses of all the datasets that we could gain access to. After reviewing publicly available databases and contacting private survey agencies and sponsoring charities for access to their data, we obtained eighteen different datasets across six different survey series.
While full details of the surveys are given in Web Appendix 1, they can be grouped into three levels of robustness. Firstly, the British Social Attitudes surveys (BSA, 10 waves) and the European Social Survey (ESS) are high-quality, face-to-face surveys using random samples. Secondly, we use online panels from both Ipsos MORI (2 waves) and YouGov (2 waves). Finally, we use face-to-face surveys that use less robust sampling techniques: an Ipsos MORI face-to-face survey (based on a quota E C E EB 2 waves). In quality terms these are likely to lie between the online panels and full random surveys.
Basic descriptive characteristics of each survey are shown in Web Appendix 2.
These sampling differences must be borne in mind when interpreting the results below. Online panels are increasingly used in social research and generally show similar distributions of political variables to face-to-face surveys using random samples, but we would expect the samples to be slightly skewed towards those with greater political interest/knowledge (Sanders et al. 2007, Liu and Wang 2014) . Levels of knowledge from the online panels are therefore likely to be upper bounds on population values, an knowledge, but rather as the best estimate of such knowledge that is presently available.
Defining myths
T t the boundaries of reasonable beliefs, given inherent uncertainty about the truth. We explain this case-by-case below.
For questions where respondents are asked to state a percentage of the population, however, we adopt a general rule of using windows of ten percentage points around the correct value (or from 0-10%, if the true value is lower than 5%). While arbitrary, this allows respondents some margin for 5% or 10%.
Results
Benefit fraud
O T to answer than it might appear.
Five different survey questions have been asked about fraud. Mostly these ask explicitly about fraud
to capture a slightly broader concept than fraud. Questions also differ in whether they ask about fraud as a percentage of claims or of spending -ofwo F full wording, see
Web Appendix S3).
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significant differences between the different questions, although whether these are due to the question, the survey mode or the sample is unclear. Overall, people thought that 29-37% of claims were fraudulent or false, and 24-27% of spending was on false claims. (Medians are lower than means, with the average person saying they thought 25-35% of claims and 20% of spending was fraudulent B study). M these figures to the official Government fraud estimates, but there are several further considerations here.
[ Table 1 Secondly, some fraud will go undetected, particularly cash-in-hand earnings (Dean and Melrose, 1996) , but also some organized fraud. Indeed, in a British Social Attitudes question in 2011, 54%
thought that it was not very or not at all likely that someone who falsely claims benefits will be caught. 2 It is however important to separate out the detection of fraud among claimants as a whole, G measure the level of fraud. In 2012/13, a random sample of 26,000 cases were reviewed, initially collating information from various Government and local authority sources before interviewing the claimant at their home (see Web Appendix 4). The
Government infers that fraud is taking place either if fraud is then investigated further and proved in court, or if the claimant terminates or changes their claim shortly after the interview, and where -checking process. This is best practice internationally, and was the only aspect of Government fraud management that was praised in an otherwise critical report (Gee et al. 2010:9) . The resulting fraud estimates are indeed much lower than average fraud perceptions, varying between 0.3% of spending on incapacity benefits to 3.9% C A
It is impossible to rule out the possibility of some fraud being missed in this exhaustive exercise.
However, given the intensive nature of Government fraud measurement, it goes too far to say that (Taunton-Collins 2013). Instead, we can (subjectively) divide reasonable from unreasonable perceptions of fraud. Given the difficulty in inferring if it is close to the estimate for fraud and claimant error combined (see Web Appendix 4). The available fraud plus claimant error estimates are all below 5%, so the range considered to be correct is 0-10% (as shown
From this, we classify 27-37% of respondents as correct (or 15-19% 
Benefit spending
Rather than assess the exact number of billions spent on the benefits system which would relative size of different aspects of public spending. W benefits for the J A ; see Web Appendix 4), there is more certainty here than when looking at benefit fraud.
[ Table 2 about here]
Within public spending as a whole, social security is the largest single component and this is moderately well-known. (Questions that ask respondents to choose the correct answer from a list of categories, as in this case, are shown in Table 2 ). In 2001, 31.3% correctly thought that social security benefits were the largest area of government spending (B1), and around half (49%) thought that it was one of the top two areas of spending (B2), with very few (2%) thinking it was the lowest (B5). Overall, more than half (63%) knew that health, pensions or working-age benefits were within the 2-3 biggest areas of public spending (B4), while more than 80% knew that benefits (pensions + working-age benefits), education or health were within the top two areas of spending (B3).
However, fewer people had higher levels of knowledge : only 9% managed to name all of the top 2-3 areas of spending (working age benefits, state pensions, and health; not shown in Table 2 ). And within the social security budget, levels of knowledge deteriorate. Only 27% of people knew that retirement pensions were the largest area of spending in 2001 (and only 46% thought it was within the top two of five listed areas of social security), with far more people (44%) saying that unemployment benefits were largest (B6-9). More recently, people were split as to whether J A B10) despite pensions costing ten times the amount of unemployment benefits. The same picture can be seen elsewhere, whether on A or how much raising the state pension age would save (B11). Even accepting that the unemployment benefit costs are slightly un W A
Perceptions of levels of spending on other areas of the benefits system are inconsistent. Only 4% in 2001 said that benefits for disabled people were the most expensive part of the social security system, and over 40% thought they were the least expensive, even though this was the secondlargest area of spending behind pensions (B6-9). At the same time, people know that free bus travel and free TV licences for pensioners are relatively inexpensive (with over half correctly saying that cutting this would save the least of a range of policy options; B12). It is therefore unfair to say that the public know nothing about benefit spending. However, there seems to be a continuing and considerable misperception about the relative costs of unemployment benefits and state pensions.
Extent of benefit claims
One obvious explanation for why people overestimate spending on unemployment benefits is that they may overestimate the number of claimants which we explore in this section. Again, the true higher than the best estimates of the actual figures (8%, 6%, and 4% respectively), echoing past overestimates found in Golding & Middleton (1982) .
However, when we look across all benefits (using a question kindly run by Ipsos MORI), the average respondent thinks that 15% of the working-age population claimed out-of-work benefits at any one time in 2015 (A10). This is perhaps surprisingly accurate (the true figure is 11.4%), particularly given that unemployment itself is so overestimated. Indeed, the median perception of unemployment (B12) plus long-term sickness (B15) in ESS is at least 30%, 3 double the perceived level of out-of-work benefits in the Ipsos MORI poll. This may be for methodological reasons. Respondents are likely to be swayed by the response options presented to them (Schwarz 1999), and so the extensive sequence of high response options presented in ESS may bias respondents to higher estimates.
Alternatively, ESS may be more nationally representative than the other surveys that are liable to be biased towards more knowledgeable respondents (as above), or that people are aware that many unemployed/disabled people do not claim benefits.
In terms of accuracy, we consistently see that only a minority (19-30%) a considerable one, but still very much a minority of the British public give a (roughly) correct answer to any of these questions. In nearly all cases the incorrect responses were over-estimates of the levels of unemployment, sickness/disability or out-of-work benefit claims. It is nevertheless worth highlighting that in 2015, a substantial minority (23%) underestimate the level of out-of-work benefit claims.
Finally, we can also look at perceived trends in out-of-work benefit claims (A10-A12). The average respondent in 2015 thought that benefit claims had risen fractionally since 2000, in contrast to administrative data showing they have fallen noticeably (from 14.3% to 11.4% of the working-age population). However, there was a large spread of responses, with 34% perceiving a fall in benefit I roughly the correct size (a 1-7 percentage point decline), then only 21% are correct, with 66% over-estimating the trend (i.e. thinking that claims have stayed the same or risen), and 13% underestimating it (i.e. thinking that claims have fallen by more than they actually have). The fall in outof-work benefit receipt is not a widely-perceived phenomenon.
Value of benefits
Many people overestimate the extent of spending on unemployment benefits, as we have seen. The previous section has suggested that people overestimate the extent of unemployment per se, but another simple explanation is that people over-estimate how much each claimant receives part of
T
The main evidence comes from the BSA using an indirect method (some of these questions have been analysed in the BSA reports (e.g. Taylor-Gooby & Martin 2008), although without looking across the full set of questions systematically). Initially, people are asked whether someone whose 25-year old unemployed woman living alone). People are then given the true amount, and then asked again whether this person has enough to live on. Those people who change their response to say that the person is actually harder-up than they thought are treated as overestimating the true benefit, while those who change their response to say that the person is living more comfortably than they thought are treated as underestimating it.
Not only do these questions allow us to compare understanding of different types of benefits (the questions variously ask about carers, unemployed people, and pensioners, varied by family type), but we can also look at changes in understanding from 1994-2013. There are however two caveats.
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these values, we find that most of them are accurate, but a few are wrong (see Web Appendix 4); we draw attention to these where relevant below. Secondly, this question will give a lower bound on.
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some benefits that people tend to overestimate. For unemployment benefits, noticeably more people in recent years overestimate the benefit than underestimate it (8-11% more for a single woman, 27-28% more for a childless couple). This seems to be the case for most years in which this question has been asked, although for the unemployed single woman in 1994 (the earliest year available), people were as likely to underestimate as overestimate the benefit. Overestimates were also found in studies that ask people to give a figure for the level of benefits, including a family with two children on Supplementary Benefit in the late 1970s (Golding and Middleton 1982) , and the couple rate of unemployment benefit in 2012 (A13, notwithstanding the problems of establishing the true figure; see Web Appendix 4).
[ Table 3 about here]
Contrary to widespread assumptions, though, people did not systematically overestimate the levels of other types of benefits indeed, in general they systematically underestimated them, believing that benefits were in fact lower than they really are. This was the case for:
-Carers gure here is contentious (although not strictly W A -Unemployed single mothers for most years (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , where 14-25% more people underestimated than overestimated the benefit (falling to 4% in 2008). This is a particularly stri B"A excluded Child Benefit and are therefore even lower than claimants would actually receive (see Web Appendix 4).
-Pensioners 1998-2008, with 15-48% more people overestimating than underestimating the level of benefits for both pensioner couples and single pensioners. This does not mean that most people thought pensions were too generous; even after hearing the true value, respondents were still far more likely to say that pensioners were -64% vs. 2-11% respectively, analyses not shown). But it does show that the assumption that most people systematically overestimate the level of state benefits is wrong.
It is possible to summarize this by saying that people tend to overestimate unemployment benefits, but considerably underestimate support to pensioners and unemployed families. Yet alongside this,
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, sizeable minorities of people were both underestimating and overestimating the level of benefits (and as noted previously, the question design means that these are lower bounds on misperceptions). If we look at the single question that asks people to give the exact value of unemployment benefits for a couple (A13, and noting the issues over the true value in Web Appendix 4), then over 10% estimate this as less than half of the actual value, and over 10% estimate this to be more than twice the actual value. As Philip Converse famously put it when describing political knowledge (in Barabas 2012), public knowledge has a low mean but a high variance.
Other beliefs: better off in work, and JSA durations " people are better-off on benefits than in-work P L which depends on perceptions of incomes both out-of-work and in-work. There is some evidence that people do underestimate in-work incomes; a DWP report using similar questions to the previous section (Kelly 2008 ) finds considerable underestimates of how much government support a two-parent two-child family with one earner would receive, perhaps reflecting increases in spending on such benefits in the 2000s (which had complex implications for how much people were better-off to progress at work; Brewer and Shephard 2004) .
Similarly, a TUC mythbuster (using B14) claims that only 21% of people know that an unemployed couple with two children would be better-off if one of them worked 30hrs/wk at the minimum H A -estimate, partly because the TUC seem to have slightly over-estimated how much better-off people would be if they worked work (we make this £128), but more importantly because this figure excludes other costs and income losses that people would face in taking up employment (see Web Appendix 4). While it still seems likely that this unemployed couple would be better-off in work (and --to-work support), the extent that perceptions match reality is difficult to estimate in the absence of further information. then 24% are correct, with 23% giving underestimates and 54% giving overestimates. This seems to be an area of ignorance rather than misperception (perhaps unsurprisingly given that it is not muchdiscussed in public debate), with the responses being almost randomly spread from 0 to 100.
Discussion
Limitations
I
Firstly, there is always a risk of non-response bias in sample surveys, and such biases are likely to be greater for the online panels that we include in our review. However, previous studies suggest that online samples will be biased to more knowledgeable respondents, and the public may therefore be even less informed than our results suggest. Secondly, our findings may not strictly reflect T s evid decrease their partisan bias (Prior and Lupia 2008, Bullock et al. 2013) , and misperceptions may therefore reflect a lack of effort on the part of the respondent to provide accurate responses, with F views much as this is often the way that mythbusters have been framed. Still, uncertainty is not I benefits system, we make a judgement necessarily subjective, but both transparent and grounded in the best available evidence G social science among academics, students and the wider public (a movement we are involved in through the Kent Q-Step Centre), we hope that the information in this paper will enable readers to interrogate the facts for themselves, rather than simply defer to them.
Conclusions
W B the benefits system is widespread, there is little previous evidence as to what the public believe, and even less as to whether such beliefs are accurate. Using 46 measures across 18 different datasets, this paper has shown against such expectations that there are some areas where people misperceive the benefits system in ways that do not seem likely to lead to harsh attitudes. In particular, people tend to underestimate the value of benefits for pensioners and unemployed people with children. A substantial minority (nearly one in four) also underestimate the level of out-of-work benefit claims.
And there are even some areas about which the public are (on average) relatively accurate. For example, the average person is surprisingly accurate in knowing the share of the population who currently claim out-of-work benefits.
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benefits system is low, as even where the public are right on average, on almost no measure do more than one-third of individuals provide a correct answer as we define it. And the public are often not right on average. People wildly overestimate unemployment benefits compared to pensions, and overestimate how much unemployment claimants without children receive. Half of people believe that out-of-work benefit claims have risen in the past fifteen years, whereas they have fallen noticeably. And while it is difficult to know the true level of benefit fraud exactly, the public overestimate fraud compared to any reasonable figure.
Implications
The implicit and often explicit claim (TUC 2013 , Hills 2014 in most of the mythbusters is that these myths drive negative attitudes towards benefit claimants. However, it is difficult to test empirically whether this is true. Elsewhere, we show that many but not all of these beliefs are associated with the v political affiliations (AUTHOR CITATION 1). Based on this, and wider experimental evidence, we y) to beliefs. However, there is a large caveat here: there is far more to getting public support for the benefits system than simply mythbusting those times (e.g. post-war Britain) and places (e.g. Nordic countries) in which the public see benefit claimants as more deserving are not necessarily characterized by accurate perceptions of benefits, and the evidence suggests mythbusting itself is unlikely to consistently produce strong changes in attitudes (AUTHOR CITATION 2). The role of benefit myths in public attitudes should not be overstated, yet neither should it be denied.
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the media do encourage the public to misperceive the benefits system (see Baumberg et al. 2012) ignorance, like knowledge, is socially produced (Slater 2012). The actors best placed to tackle this are the UK Statistics Authority (via changes to their Code of Practice for Statistics) and public providers of benefit statistics (not least the DWP), and the recommendations in Baumberg et al (2012:88-89) therefore apply here. But to the extent that the providers of statistics are unwilling to take steps to improve public knowledge, then the best that we can do is to support those organisations that are trying to reward truthfulness and embarrass misinterpretations F (http://fullfact.org) in the hope that a society that incentivizes truthfulness in the long run will become a more truthful society. Tables   Tables 1-3 are shown on the following pages. 
Notes
